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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court of Appeals pursuant
to Section 78-2a-3 (2) (h), Utah Code Annotated.
from a

This is an appeal

Summary Judgment granted by the Honorable Raymond S. Uno,

District Court Judge on August 10, 1987, and amended on September
8,

plaintifffs

1987, dismissing

Complaint as to all causes of

action and granting defendant judgment in

the sum

of $28,609.97

plus interest and costs of court.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.
two

Whether the

contracts

enforceable

District Court

between

because

plaintiff

they

failed

erred in
and

holding that the

defendant

were

not

to comply with the Statute of

Frauds.
2.

Whether an implied

dealing extends

to contracts

covenant

of

good

faith

and fair

which do not meet the requirements

of the Statute of Frauds.
3.

Whether

defendant's

questions

alleged

of

fact

exist

with

regard

to

interference with contractual relationships

between plaintiff and third parties.
4.

Whether defendant was unjustly enriched as

plaintiff's activities in the Salt Lake area.

2

a result of

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
70A-1-203 Utah Code Annotated (1981 Rep. Vol.)
Obligation of good faith.
Every contract or duty within this act imposes an obligation
of good faith in its performance or enforcement.
70A-2-201 Utah Code Annotated (1981 Rep. Vol.)
Formal requirements - Statute of frauds.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a
contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more
is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there
is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for
sale has been made between the parties and signed by the
party against
whom enforcement
is sought or by his
authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient
because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon
but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph
beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a
writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient
against the sender is received and the party receiving it
has reason
to know
its contents,
it satisfies the
requirements of subsection
(1) against such party unless
written notice of objection to its contents is given within
ten days after it is received.
i

(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements
of subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is
enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured
for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others
in the ordinary course of the seller's business and the

seller, before

notice

of

repudiation

is

received

and

under circumstances which reasonably indicated that the
goods are for the buyer, has made either a substantial
beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their
procurement; or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is
sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise
in court that a contract for sale was made, but the

3

contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond
the quantity of goods admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has
been made and accepted or which have been received and
accepted (section 70A-2-606).
70A-2-206(l) Utah Code Annotated (1981 Rep. Vol.)
Offer and acceptance in formation of contract.
(1) Unless otherwise
language or circumstances

unambiguously

indicated

by the

(a) an offer
to make
a contract shall be
construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by
any medium reasonable in the circumstances;
(b) an order or other offer to buy goods for
prompt or current shipment shall be construed as
inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship
or by the prompt or current shipment of nonconforming
goods, but such a shipment of nonconforming goods does
not constitute an acceptance if the seller seasonably
notifies the buyer that the shipment is offered only as
an accommodation to the buyer.
2-201(2) Uniform Commercial Code Official Comments.
1.
The required writing need not contain all the
material terms of the contract and such material terms as
are stated need not be precisely stated.
All that is
required is that the writing afford a basis for believing
that the offered oral evidence rests on a real transaction.
It may be written in lead pencil on a scratch pad. It need
not indicate which party is the buyer and which the seller.
The only term which must appear is the quantity term which
need not be accurately stated but recovery is limited to the
amount stated.
The price, time and place of payment or
delivery, the general quality
of the
goods, or any
particular warranties may all be omitted.
Special emphasis must be placed on the permissibility
of omitting the price term in view of the insistence of some
courts on the express inclusion of this term even where the
parties have contracted on the basis of a published price
list.
In many valid contracts for sale the parties do not
mention the price in express terms, the buyer being bound to
pay and the seller to accept a reasonable price which the
trier of the fact may well be trusted to determine.
Again,
frequently the price is not mentioned since the parties have
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based their agreement on a price list or catalogue known to
both of them and this list serves as an efficient safeguard
against perjury.
Finally, "market" prices and valuations
that are current in the vicinity constitute a similar check.
Thus if the price is not stated in the memorandum it can
normally be supplied without danger of fraud.
Of course if
the "price" consists of goods rather than money the quantity
of goods must be stated.
Only three definite and invariable requirements as to
the memorandum are made by this subsection. First, it must
evidence a contract for the sale of goods; second, it must
be "signed", a word which includes any authentication which
identifies the party to be charged; and third, it must
specify a quantity.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case arises from a distributor relationship between the

parties wherein
distributor

Beehive

for

brick

Brick,
and

Inc.

related

agreed
products

to

act

as local

manufactured

by

Robinson Brick Company.

Beehive complains that Robinson breached

its

agreement and caused damages to Beehive.

duties

under

the

The complaint filed by Beehive alleges breach of
respects,

failure

to

deal

in

good

faith,

contract in two
interference with

contract and unjust enrichment.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
Upon filing of the

Complaint

and

service

upon defendant,

Robinson answered and counterclaimed against Beehive for sums due
and owing to Robinson pursuant to an open
Beehive.

5

account agreement with

Following substantial discovery, Robinson filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment seeking
requesting

judgment

dismissal

on

its

of

Beehive's

Counterclaim.

Complaint and

At

hearing

on

Robinson's Motion for Summary Judgment held on July 28, 1987, the
Court, without findings, granted Summary Judgment as requested by
Robinson.

An Amended Summary Judgment

records on

September 9,

1987.

was entered

Notice

on the Court

of Appeal was filed by

Beehive on September 15, 1987.
C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On or about February 20, 1985, plaintiff Beehive Brick

Inc. and defendant Robinson Brick Company, entered into agreement
allowing Beehive to sell
their Colorado plant.
2.

Beehive

products

manufactured

by

Robinson at

the

distributor

(Record at page 3, 15.)

was

initially

told

that

relationship would be a testing period and that

the relationship

would only become permanent if Beehive could adequately represent
the interests of Robinson Brick

in

Utah.

(Deposition

of Dee

Young, pages 18 and 19; Record at page 15.)
3.

On or

about July

Robinson was terminating
appointed a
Lake area.
4.

At

competitor as

15, 1985, Beehive was notified that

the

distributor

relationship

and had

the exclusive distributor in the Salt

(Record at page 3, 16, 39.)
the

time

the

distributorship

arrangement

terminated, Robinson agreed to allow Beehive to place orders
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was

prior to

October 15, 1985.

(Record at page 3, 16; Deposition of

Randall Browning, Exhibit 13.)
5.

Prior to October 15, 1985, Beehive placed an order with

Robinson for one million brick.
be

of

a

However,

particular
Beehive

color

further

Beehive requested that the brick

requiring
indicated

could not be manufactured, the stock

special
that

manufacturing.

if the special color

color would

be acceptable.

(Deposition of Randall Browning at pages 84-86, Exhibit 7.)
6.

At

the

time

the

notified that delivery of

order was placed, both parties were

the one

over a period of 12 to 14 months.

million brick

would be taken

(Deposition of Dee Young, page

32.)
7.

Between November of 1985 and February of 1986, Robinson

attempted on

at least three occasions to manufacture the special

color requested by Beehive and, in
batches

to

customer.

Beehive

which

were

fact, delivered

several test

accepted and used by Beehive's

(Deposition of Randall Browning at page 88; Deposition

of Dee Young, page 44-46.)
8.

Toward the end of March, 1986, Robinson advised Beehive

that it would be able to
distributorship.
9.

Between

give Beehive

approximately

start placing orders.
On or

or split

(Deposition of Dee Young at page 55-56.)

1986, employees of Robinson

10.

a non-exclusive

March

30, 1986

encouraged Beehive

and April 15,

to get

ready to

(Deposition of Dee Young, page 58.)

about April

15, 1986

Robinson notified Beehive

that they would not grant the split distributorship
7

and would be

terminating

the

relationship

immediately.

(Deposition of Dee

Young, page 60.)
11.
Beehive

By

letter

that

they

dated
would

arrangement immediately.
not

be

able

to

April
again

Said

manufacture

Beehive, but would fill the
were in stock.

17, 1986, Robinson notified
be

terminating the dealership

letter indicated
the

order

special
by

that they would

color

requested by

substituting

brick which

The letter further advised Beehive that they must

take delivery of the remaining order by May 16, 1986. (Deposition
of Randall Browning, Exhibit 14; Record at page 62; Deposition of
Monte Jones, Exhibit 2.)
12.

At the time of

termination, Beehive

owed Robinson the

sum of $28,609.97 pursuant to their open account agreement.
13.

Subsequent

to

April

17,

1986, Robinson's

approached former customers of Beehive in an attempt
one

million

brick

order

previously

placed

agents

to fill the
by

Beehive.

Court

erred in

(Deposition of Randall Browning at page 118.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.
granting

Beehive

contends

that

the

Summary

Judgment

relating

District
to

the

contract

for the

purchase of one million brick due to the existence of substantial
questions of

fact relating

to the

existence of the contract as

well as substantial questions of law
by the

various parties

with the

Frauds.
8

relating to

the compliance

requirements of the Statute of

2.

Beehive complied

of Frauds in relation
Robinson

and,

as

with the

requirements of the Statute

to

its

distributorship

such,

the

District

arrangement with

Court erred in granting

Summary Judgment.
3.

The

applicable

obligation

to

all

obligation to act

of

good

stages
in

faith

and

fair

dealing is

of the contract relationship.

good

faith

is

not

contingent

The

upon the

enforceability of the underlying contract.
4.

The District

Court erred

as to Beehive's Third

Cause of

in granting summary judgment

Action due

to the

existence of

questions of fact regarding Robinson's attempts to interfere with
contracts of Beehive.
5.

Beehive conferred substantial benefit

serving as

a distributor

distributor

in

the

at a

Salt

temporary distributorship
be granted a permanent
represent

the

time when

Lake

area.

Robinson had no other
Beehive

accepted

the

with the understanding that they would

distributorship if

products

upon Robinson by

of

Robinson.

they could adequately

Beehive should be fairly

compensated for the benefit which they conferred upon Robinson.

ARGUMENT
I.

SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW
EXISTED WHICH PRECLUDED THE ENTRY OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RELATIVE TO PLAINTIFF'S
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

The First Cause of
breach

of

a

Action

contractual

in

Beehive's

relationship
9

Complaint alleges

between

Beehive

and

Robinson.

Specifically, Beehive contends that while acting as a

distributor

for

approximately

one

manufacture.
customer of

Robinson,
million

Beehive
brick

placed
of

a

an

special

The order was placed pursuant to
Beehive named Emerson Larkin.

the order

District Court

action.

decision

in

substantial

two

summary

judgment

Beehive asserts
respects.

issues

color

and

from a

Beehive contends that
Beehive when

and subsequently refused to perform.

granted

cause of

for

a request

Robinson breached its contractual relationship with
it accepted

order

of

fact

that the

First,
were

with

regard

The

to this

court erred in its

plaintiff

contested.

contends that Robinson was not entitled to summary

believes

that

Second, Beehive
judgment as a

matter of law.
A.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN GRANTED DUE TO THE EXISTENCE
OF MATERIAL QUESTIONS OF FACT

Utah Courts have traditionally held that summary judgment is
proper only when there are no genuine issues of material
question.

Jensen v.

Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.,

611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980), Frisbee v. K & K
P.2d 387

(Utah 1984),

1390 (Utah 1980).
the

courts

should be

viewed and

summary judgment.

Heglar Ranch,

In evaluating

Judgment,

In

fact in

have

Construction Co., 676

Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d

the facts

held

resolved in

presented at Summary

that any doubt or uncertainty
favor of

the party resisting

the case of Frisbee v. K & K Construction

Co., 767 P.2d 387 (1984), the court held:

10

If
there
is
any doubt or uncertainty
concerning questions of fact, doubt should be
resolved in favor of the opposing party.
Thus, the court must evaluate all evidence
and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn
from evidence in light most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment.
Frisbee at

389.

See also

Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434

(Utah 1982), Thompson v. Ford Motor

Company, 395

1964),

P.2d

Bilhmaier

v.

Carson,

603

790

Supreme Court has consistently

held

that

obtain

from

several

statements

of

pleadings, depositions,
and affidavits.
(Utah 1980).
sworn

Heglar

fact
answers

is

1983).

Beehive

the

to

Webster

contends

The

trial

court can

sources

including

interrogatories, admissions

court

sufficient

precluding summary judgment.
(Utah

(Utah 1979).

Ranch Inc. v. Stillman,

Additionally, the

statement

to

P.2d, 62 (Utah

has

619 P.2d 1390

held

that

a single

create

an

issue

of facts

v.

Sill,

675

P.2d 1170

that

several

of

Robinson's

"undisputed facts" were in fact disputed by sworn statements.
In

Robinson's

Summary Judgment

Memorandum

in

Support

of

its

Motion for

(Record at p. 36), it presents as an undisputed

fact that:
I.
Beehive claims to have sent Robco
an order in writing for the so-called one
million brick order.
Browning Deposition at
29 & Ex. 7.
Robco claims not to have
received any written order.
Robco's manager
of distributor
sales, however, discussed
Beehive's desire for the one million bricks
over the telephone. Jones Deposition at 49,
51, 71.
The written order allegedly sent
from Beehive to Robco was undated and did not
indicate any date by which the Provincial
Antique
bricks
should
be delivered to
Beehive. Browning Deposition at 29 & Ex. 7.
At the time this order was placed, the price
11

for one
$500.00.

milllion bricks
was more
Browning Deposition Ex. 8-11.

than

(Record at page 40.)
In reviewing these references to the
to support
dialogue

the statement
in

the

set out

deposition

of

record which
above, we

Beehivefs

Robinson uses

find the following
President,

Randall

Browning:
Q

The next document I want you to look at has been marked
for identification
appears to

be a

purposes as

Exhibit No.

7, and it

purchase order on a form with Beehive

Brick, Inc. on it and it

appears to

be purchase order

number 725, addressed to Robinson Brick Company.
me what that is.

Have

you seen

it before,

Tell

first of

all?
A

Yes I have.

Q

Tell me what it is.

A

That

is

our

purchase

order of one million

order to Robinson Brick on the

brick

placed

to

us

by Emerson

Larkin.
Deposition of Randall Browning at page 29.
Additionally, Robinson's

general sales manager, Monte Jones

States:
Q

Are you aware that Emerson Larkin

had placed

for a million provincial antique brick?
A

Through hearsay only.

Q

Do you recall who told you that they had?

12

an order

A

I

recall

a

discussion

with

Dee

Young concerning a

desire for a million provincial antique.
Q

Do

you

know

if

that

discussion

occurred

prior to

October 15, 1985?
A

Yes.

Deposition of Monte Jones at page 49.
Beehive

contends

that

Robinson's

own

references

record, when viewed in a light most favorable
questions of

fact as

to whether

or not

to the

to Beehive, create

an order was placed by

Beehive and accepted by Robinson.
Robinson further contends in its Memorandum

of Support that

the order was never confirmed in writing by Robinson.

Robinson's

Memorandum states as follows:
K.
The alleged one million brick order
was never confirmed in writing by Robco. In
particular, there exists no writing by which
Robco confirmed that it would provide the
million bricks to Beehive, that it would do
so over a period of one year, or that it was
able to produce the type of bricks that
Beehive wished it to produce.
Browning
Deposition at 54 & Ex. 1-16; Jones Deposition
at 81-82.
(Record at page 40.)
Beehive

notes

that

referencing to Exhibits

Robinson
1-16

which

Browning Deposition.

Exhibit

dated April 17, 1986

from

Company to

Mr. Randall

supports
had

this

been

paragraph by

attached

to the

14 to said deposition is a letter

Monte

S.

Jones

of

Robinson Brick

Browning of Beehive Brick which contains

the following language:

13

5.
The existing order of 1,000,000 Provincial
Antique (special color) for Emerson Larkin cannot be
produced.
We will allow substitutions with the
following: Dover Gray, Heritage Antique, Provincial
Antique and Provincial Antique special lot.
The following is a current list of open orders we
are willing to fill, provided inventory is available: . . .
Emerson Larkin Order
040496

Provincial Antique
1,000,000
(Dover Grey, Prov. Antiq., Hert. Antiq.)

Beehive again

contends that

Robinson's own citation to the

record, in support of its "undisputed
of

fact

as

Robinson.

to

the

existence

Beehive's statement

contained in

fact," creates

of a confirmation in writing by
of additional

its Memorandum

in Opposition

and disputed facts
to Summary Judgment.

Record at 63 refers to the same letter (attached as
the

Deposition

of

Monte

Affidavit of

submitted

in

Judgment.

Plaintiff contends that the

in the

letter raises

acceptance of the

to

Robinson's

a question

order

Exhibit 2 to

Jones). Finally, the letter again was

attached as Exhibit A to the
opposition

a question

by

Motion

language set

of fact

Robinson

Dee Young, which was

and

for

Summary

forth above

as to the receipt and
its

confirmation in

writing.
A third fact suggested by Robinson to be uncontested is:
B.
All of the test runs manufactured
by Robco were unsatisfactory to Beehive and
its customer
and were rejected.
Young
Deposition at 41-46; Browning Deposition at
88; Jones Deposition at 73-74.
Record at page 41.
14

As noted

above, Robinson

supports this statement by citing

to the Deposition of Dee Young,

at 41-46.

Upon

examination of

said deposition, we find that the test runs were not rejected by
Beehive as indicated by the following testimony:
Q

Were you told how big

the

test

run

was?

How many

bricks involved?
A.

Seems to

me the figure that I recall as best I recall/

was around 50,000 brick, somewhere in that range.
Q.

How many did you want?

A.

I don't recall the specific number for one of Emerson's
next job we shipped an order of that test run.

Q.

Do you recall how many you received?

A.

I don't right now.

Q.

Was it less than 50,000?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Less than 10,000?

A.

I'm not sure.

Q.

Alright, you received the brick —

A.

He used

the brick

what happened next?

and of course I went out to look at

them with him to see what we thought and everything and
we didn't

see a

great deal

stock provincial and the test

of difference between the
run, but

I

called and

spoke with Monte about that and I believe I talked with
Jim

and

I was

just

superficial changes

reassured

may not

15

that

have been

although

the

great that Jim

knows what

he's doing

and he's getting around to what

he needs to do, I guess on a technical level.
Q,

Did you use the rest of the 50,000 of the test run?

A.

I believe we used them.

Deposition of Dee Young at p. 42.
With regard to the

second test

run, we

find the following

testimony:
Q.

Did Emerson Larkin take a look at those bricks?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What was his response?

A.

That they were getting better.

In fact, I remember the

second run was good looking and when I went out

to the

house that he was doing with the first batch of them to
see again how
excited when

they

looked,

I

remember

being really

I was further away from the house driving

toward it and then when I got closer I could
were

still

some

of

the

things

that

see there

weren't

most

desirable, but it was definitely improved color.
Q.

What did Emerson Larkin say about it?

A.

About the same thing.

They were on

the way.

We felt

encouraged after the second run.
Q.

Did you order the rest of the bricks from that run?

A.

We used

bricks from

the rest

them.
Deposition of Dee Young, at pages 44-45.
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of the run as he needed

Finally,

with

regard

to

the

third

test

run, Mr. Young

testified as follows:
Q.

You received and Emerson

Larkin received

a portion of

that run, I take it?
A.

That is correct.

Deposition of Dee Young, at p. 46.
Beehive's
(Record at

Statement

of

Additional

p. 64), states that

rejected, and

all of

and

Disputed

the test

Facts,

runs were not

cites to the deposition of Dee Young, a portion of

which has been reproduced above.
Beehive contends that the testimony set out above
question of

fact as

to the

creates a

acceptance or rejection of the test

run provided to Beehive by Robinson.
In light of the facts which
the parties

to this

were presented

action, respondents

and disputed by

contend that the facts

when viewed in a light most favorable to Beehive indicate genuine
issues

of

material

order was placed,
memorandum

was

fact

that

it

generated

which support the proposition that an
was

accepted

which

proves

contract, that it was performed in part and
was generally

accepted by

cancellation of
erred in

by
the

Robinson,
existence

that a
of

a

that the performance

Beehive, up to the time of Robinson's

the contract.

Accordingly,

the District Court

granting Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's First Cause

of Action due to the existence of disputed material facts.
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B.

The

SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN GRANTED IN FAVOR OF ROBINSON
AS A MATTER OF LAW.

basis

of

Robinson's

respect to Plaintiff's

First

Motion for Summary Judgment with
Cause

of

Action

focuses

on the

alleged unenforceability of the one million brick order placed by
Beehive.

Specifically, Robinson

contends that

the order placed

by Beehive did not comply with the requirements of the statute of
frauds as set forth in Section 70A-2-201.
the order

Beehive contends that

did comply with the requirements of, or exceptions to,

the statute of frauds in several respects.
Section 70A-2-201(l) (Utah

Code

Annotated

1981

Rep Vol.)

states that:
Except as otherwise provided in this section,
a contract for the sale of goods for the
price of $500 or more is not enforceable by
way of action or defense unless there is some
writing
sufficient
to
indicate that a
contract for sale has been made between the
parties and signed by the party against whom
enforcement is sought or by his authorized
agent or broker.
As

noted

April

above,

17, 198 6

acknowledges

the

Robinson
to

Brick

Mr.

Randy

existence

of

Robinson's part to fill the order
Deposition
Browning,
fulfills

of

Monte

Exhibit
the

Company mailed a letter dated
Browning
the

14.

requirement

Beehive
that

at

61).

writing

that

See also,

this

letter

"indicate

that a

contract for sale has been made between the party."
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which

2, Deposition of Randall

contends
the

Beehive

Order and a willingness on

(Record

Jones, Exhibit

of

This letter

also fulfills

the requirements of Subpart 2 to

the Statute of Frauds which states:
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable
time a
writing in
confirmation of the
contract and sufficient against the sender is
received and the party receiving it has
reason to know its contents, it satisfies the
requirements of subsection (1) against such
party unless written notice of objection to
its contents is given within 10 days after it
is received.
See 70A-2-20M2) (Utah Code Annotated 1981 Rep Vol.)
Again, the letter of April 17, 1986 constitutes a writing in
confirmation

of

the

contract

official comments to Section

pursuant to subsection (2). The

2-201(2) of

the Uniform Commercial

Code indicate that a writing "need not contain all material terms
of the contract and such material terms as are stated need not be
precisely

stated.

All

that

is

required is that the writing

afford a basis for believing that the offered oral evidence rests
on a

real transaction."

writing,

the

official

With

regard to the sufficiency of the

comments

again

address

only

three

requirements.
"First, it must evidence a contract for the
sale of goods; Second, it must be 'signed,1
a word which includes authentication which
identifies the party to be charged; and
Third, it must specify a quantity."
In reviewing

the April

17, 1986

letter (Record at page 61), we

find that there is evidence that a contract for the sale of goods
exists by

the language in said letter referring to the "existing

order of one million provincial antique" and their willingness to
fill said

order from available inventory.
19

We also note that the

letter was signed on behalf of Robinson Brick Company by Monte S.
Jones,

Manager,

quantity

of

Distributor

brick

(i.e.,

Sales
one

Division.

million)

is

Finally,

the

identified in two

different places.
Beehive acknowledges that the
and

conditions

of

the

letter

contains

other terms

proposed contracts relating to delivery

dates, available colors and Robinson's ability to produce special
colors.

However,

these

sufficiency of the document
statute of

fraud.

issues

are

to satisfy

not

relevant

the requirements

to

the

of the

As noted above, a writing is not insufficient

because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon

by the

parties.
Assuming arguendo

that the

satisfy the requirements of

April 17,

subsections 1

1986 letter does not
and 2

of the Statute

of Frauds, plaintiff would draw the courtfs attention to Section
70A-2-201(3)(a), which states:
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the
requirements of subsection (1) but which is
valid in other respects is enforceable (a) if
the goods are to be specially manufactured
for the buyer and are not suitable for sale
to others in the ordinary course of seller's
business, and the seller before notice of
repudiation is received and under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the
goods are for the buyer, has made either a
substantial beginning of their manufacture or
commitments for their procurement.
In analyzing

subsection (3)(a), we note that a party may be

excused from the "writing" requirements of subsection (1) and (2)

20

1.
The goods
are to
manufactured for the buyer.

be

specially

2.
They are not suitable for sale to
others in the ordinary course of seller's
business.
3.
The seller has made a substantial
beginning in their manufacture or commitments
for their procurement prior to receipt of
notice of repudiation.
In applying

the facts

of this

note that brick in question were

case to

to be

subsection (3), we

different in

color than

the provincial antique commonly stocked by Robinson and, as such,
would need to be specially manufactured.
also Deposition

61. See

of Monte Jones, Exhibit 2, Deposition of Randall

Browning, Exhibit 14).
indicates that

(Record at p.

In

addition,

approximately 400,000

testimony

of

Dee Young

brick out of the 1,000,000

brick order had already been manufactured (See Deposition
Young, pages 41-46).

No evidence was presented by Robinson which

would indicate that the special
suitable

for

resale

to

color

other

the Statute

of Frauds.

creates a

or

customers.

were not
Beehive

requirements of subsection

contract

manufacture of

contract which

were

Accordingly,

that a memorandum evidencing the
attempted special

brick

Robinson

contends that these facts support the
(3) of

of Dee

even if we assume

does

not

exist, the

the goods requested by Beehive

satisfies the

requirements of Section

70A-2-20M3) .
The

Code

Frauds rule.

also

provides

Section 70A-2-206

an

exception

Utah

Vol.) indicates that:
21

Code

to

the Statute of

Annotated

(1981 Rep

(b) An order or other offer to buy goods for
prompt current shipment shall be construed as
inviting acceptance either by prompt promise
to ship or by prompt or current shipment of
conforming or nonconforming goods. . . .
In other

words, an

order or offer to purchase goods may be

deemed accepted if the seller promises to ship

or in

fact ships

the goods to the buyer.
Robinson promised
its letter of July
Exhibit 13),

to ship the goods to Beehive by virtue of

22, 1985

which allows

(See Deposition

orders to

they will be filled and shipped.
that

three

test

runs

to

whether

or

not

shipments

for

of

the

contract.

nonconforming

goods

were

in

order.

the

is undisputed

goods

part

Beehive.
were

purposes

enforceability

of

addition, it

delivered to

the

nonconforming are irrelevant

shipment

be placed and implies that

totalling approximately 40% of the total

order were in fact shipped and
as

In

of Randy Browning,

of

conforming

or

establishing the

Accordingly,
rejected

Questions

by

even

if

Beehive, the

constitutes an acceptance of Robinson's

The District Court erred in granting

summary judgment as

a matter of law.

II.

In

THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO
BEEHIVE'S FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
specific

contract referred to in the

First Cause of Action of Plaintiff's

Complaint, Beehive's Fourth

Cause of

addition

to

Action also

the

alleges breach

Robinson's agreement to grant

of a

Beehive a
22

contract relating to

distributorship to sell

Robinson products.

Robinson

does not

Distributorship Agreement, but rather
made with

states

existence of a

that

any promises

regard to said distributorship are unenforceable since

they do not meet
found

deny the

in

the requirements

Section

Statute of

Frauds as

Code

Annotated.

Beehive

70A-2-201, Utah

contends that the court erred as
Robinson's

of the

contention

and

a

matter

granting

of

law

in adopting

summary judgment as to the

Fourth Cause of Action.
Several documents exist which establish the existence of the
distributor relationship
22, 1985, Monte S.
Company

sent

a

between Beehive

Jones
letter

acting
to

on

behalf

Deposition

Exhibit

the

In

examining

distributor relationship

of

On July

Robinson Brick

Beehive regarding the status of the

temporary distributorship (See
13).

and Robinson.

is

of

Randall Browning,

letter, we

acknowledged

by

find

that

Robinson

the

and, in

fact, Beehive was praised for the excellent work they had done to
that point in time.
Robinson

Additionally, the April 17, 1986 letter from

to

Beehive

Brick

relationship

between

the

Deposition of

two

distributorship was

admits

to

the

distributor

. Record

at

page 61,

Exhibit 13, Deposition of Monte

And finally,

Robinson

refers

parties.

Randall Browning,

Jones, Exhibit 2.
complaint,

again

in their
that

awarded (Record

Answer to plaintiff's

at
at page

least

a

temporary

15). Accordingly,

it is undisputed that a distributorship relationship of some type
existed between Beehive and

Robinson.

22,

of

1985

and

the

letter

April
23

Both the

letter of July

17, 1986 would constitute

writings which
Frauds.

would satisfy

the requirements of the Statute of

In addition, Robinson's admission that a distributorship

was granted

satisfies the

requirements of the Statute of Frauds

as set forth in Section 70A-2-201(3)(b) Utah Code Annotated (1981
Rep. Vol.) which states:
"A contract
which does not satisfy the
requirements of subsection (1) but which is
valid in other respects is enforceable. . .
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is
sought admits in his pleading, testimony or
otherwise in court that the contract for sale
was made, but the contract is not enforceable
under this provision beyond the quantity of
the goods admitted."
Accordingly,

the

Statute

of

Frauds

is

satisfied

temporary distributorship in two respects:
writings sufficient
required

by

was

and,

admitted

secondly,

in

the

to

produce

summary judgment
a

writing

the

are two

existence

pleading

requirement of Section 70A-2-201(3)(b).
have granted

First, there

to the

to indicate that a contract had been made as

70A-2-201(l)

distributorship

as

The

of a

satisfying the

court

should not

based upon the failure of Beehive

which

evidenced

the

existence

of

a

distributorship agreement.
Beehive will

acknowledge that there is a question as to the

specific terms and conditions
Beehive

contends

that

distributorship was that
distributorship to

specific

Robinson

a permanent

adequately represent
Randall Browning,

a

of the

distributorship agreement.
term

would

and

condition of the

convert

the temporary

distributorship if Beehive could

Robinson's

interest.

See

Deposition of

page 75, Deposition of Dee Young, pages 19-20
24

(Record at

page 63).

Robinson

contends that

at will

(See Deposition

essentially terminable
page

30).

While

these

of Monte Jones,

issues are obviously important to the

performance of the contract,
enforceability.

the contract was

they

do

not

serve

to

limit its

If we view the facts relating to these issues in

a light most favorable to Beehive, we find that a distributorship
agreement was

granted which

the indefinite extension of
Beehive's adequate

contained a

provision allowing for

the agreement,

contingent only upon

performance. Accordingly,

erred in granting summary judgment

as

to

the District Court

the

Fourth

Cause of

Action.
III.

THE OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING IS APPLIED IN EVERY CONTRACT
AND, AS SUCH, THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED
IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO
BEEHIVE'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

Beehive's

Second

Cause

of

Action

alleges

breached its covenant of good faith and fair
every contract

At hearing

(See 70A-1-203

Utah Code

Annotated, 1981 Rep

on the Motion for Summary Judgment, Robinson

argued that

because the

Statute

Frauds

of

dealing implicit in

and expressly required in Utah Uniform Commercial

Code transactions
Vol.).

that Robinson

that

contracts were
the

dealing did not apply to this

covenant
case.

unenforceable under the
of

good faith and fair

Beehive contends

that the

District Court erred in accepting this argument.
The Statute of Frauds as found in Section 70A-2-201 does not
indicate that a contract is void

or voidable

simply because the

contract does not comply with the Statute of Frauds.
25

Rather, the

section merely
the statute

states that a contract which fails to comply with

is not

"enforceable by

way of

action or defense."

Although in some cases an unforceable contract is tantamount to a
void contract,

this

is

not

always

the

case.

For example,

contracts which fail to comply with the Statute of Frauds but are
nevertheless capable of being
deemed void.

The

performed by

the parties

parties to such a contract have a duty to act

in good faith even though the contract may not be
a

court

of

are not

law.

Accordingly,

even

if

enforceable in

we

assume that the

contracts referred to above are not enforceable, this

should not

excuse either party from acting in good faith.
In addition,

as a

matter of

policy the

court should hold

that the obligation of good faith and fair dealing extends to all
aspects of

the contract

exist prior to

the

otherwise would

formalization

be to

early periods of the
tions)

and

relationship, even those dealings which
of

sanction bad

contractual

thereafter

the

contract.

To hold

faith activities during the

relationships

require

good faith when performing

the

(i.e., negotia-

the parties to deal strictly in
contract.

Such

a requirement

would not only be inconsistent but would remove the obligation to
act in good faith at the time when
parties deal

fairly with

Court should

not

have

it is

each other.
dismissed

Action.
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most crucial

that the

Accordingly, the District

plaintiff's

Second

Cause of

IV.

SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF FACT EXIST WITH
REGARD TO ROBINSON'S INTERFERENCE WITH
BEEHIVE'S CONTRACTS AND, AS SUCHr THE DISTRICT
COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

In its

Motion for Summary Judgment, Robinson contended that

it did not interfere
third

parties, as

with any
alleged

contracts which
in

Beehive had with

Beehive's Third Cause of Action

(Record at page 42). In support of this proposition,
to the

they refer

Deposition of Randall Browning, pages 118 and 119 and the

Deposition of Monte Jones, at page 69. Once again
citation

to

the

record

supports

Beehive's

Robinsons own

position.

In the

Deposition of Randall Browning, we find the following dialogue:
(Q)

My question to you, Mr. Browning,
personal

knowledge

Brick has

of

is whether

you have

any instance in which Robinson

instructed any

of its

authorized agents to

contact your customers.
A

My response

would be that the only instance that we're

referred to there
contacted

by

is

with

Interstate

being cut off as

Emerson
Brick

a distributor

Larkin.

the

He was

day following us

and was

asked to give

his million brick order that he had previously given to
Beehive Brick, to Interstate Brick and I think that the
only

source

that

could

come

from would be Robinson

Brick.
Deposition of Randall Browining at page 118.
Based upon the foregoing
Robinson's new

testimony,

distributor contacted

Robinson's urging to see

if the
27

Beehive

contends that

a customer of Beehive

new distributor

at

could complete

the million

brick order.

Beehive contends that these statements

alone are sufficient

to

Robinson's liability

for interference

Accordingly,

the

establish

District

Court

a

question

of

fact

as to

with Beehive's contracts.

erred

in

granting

summary

judgment on the Third Cause of Action.

V.

SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT
EXIST AND, AS SUCH, THE DISTRICT COURT
ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
BEEHIVE'S FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION.

Beehive's
meruit

Fifth

claiming

that

services provided

Cause

of

Robinson

by Beehive

distributor for Robinson.

Action
was

is an action in quantum

unjustly

enriched

by the

during the time when Beehive was a

In support

of its

Motion for Summary

Judgment, Robinson asserted that Beehive did not provide Robinson
with any goods or services (Record
this

assertion,

they

Randall Browning.
and

affirmatively

refer

at page

to

page

Beehive argued that
asserted

that

it

43).

In support of

116 of the Deposition of
this fact
did

was in dispute

provide services for

Robinson at a time when Robinson had no other distributor

in the

Salt Lake area (Record at page 64) .
Unjust enrichment
imply a promise to
neither

an

actual

Concrete Products
1987).

pay

is the doctrine under which the law
for

or
Co. v.

goods

implied

or

services

contract

Salt Lake

when

will

there is

between the parties.

County, 734

P.2d 910 (Utah

In Barrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984), the

courts enumerated the elements of unjust enrichment as follows:
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There must be (1) a benefit conferred on one
person by another; (2) an appreciation or
knowledge by the conferee of the benefit; and
(3) the acceptance or
retention by the
conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the
conferee
to
retain the benefit without
payment of its value.
Between the dates of March 1,
acted as

1985 and

April 16,

1986, Beehive

the representative of Robinson in the Salt Lake area at

a time when Robinson had lost its previous dealer.
as a

distributor, Beehive

and therefore conferred a

In so acting

maintained Robinson's market position
benefit on

said defendant.

Further,

Beehive contends that it only agreed to perform this service with
the expectation that it would

be

rewarded

for

its

efforts by

being allowed to continue in the business relationship contingent
only upon its satisfactory performance (Record age page

63). At

all

not only

times

during

the

distributor

accepted the

benefits being

Beehive

put

to

forth

rendered by

additional

appointment of the permanent
Young at pages 20-21).
possibility of an
expense,

and

Robinson

Beehive but encouraged

effort

in

order

to

distributorship (Deposition

win

of Dee

These facts at least call to question the

unjust

should

period,

enrichment

have

of

precluded

Robinson

Summary

at Beehive's

Judgment in this

matter.

CONCLUSION
Beehive maintains that it has complied
Frauds

and,

as

such,

with the

Statute of

both contracts identified in Plaintiff's

First and Fourth Causes of

Action
29

are

enforceable.

Beehive's

Second, Third

and Fifth

Causes of

dismissed due to substantial

Action should

issues of

law and

not have been
fact which were

unresolved at the time of summary judgment.
Beehive requests
Third Judicial

that the court reverse the decision of the

District Court

as to

all causes

of action, and

remand for further proceedings.
DATED this //rrf

day of December, 1987.

STAHTORET NlELgQH^Attorney for/Petitioner
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